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The United Kingdom and United Nations Peace Operations 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses the United Kingdom’s approach to United Nations (UN) peace 
operations and whether Britain is prepared politically, bureaucratically, financially, and 
militarily to increase its contributions to them. The article begins with an overview of UK 
engagement with UN peacekeeping since 1956 before discussing the political issues that 
govern British decisions about peacekeeping. The third section then assesses several 
challenges that would need to be addressed in order for the UK’s increased participation in 
UN missions to be effective. Finally, the article outlines the main factors pushing the UK 
towards greater engagement with UN peace operations, including opinions voiced by select 
domestic, international and institutional audiences. 
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 2 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) government has recently made a series of declarations that it 
intends to increase its contributions to United Nations (UN) peace operations. At the 
Peacekeeping Leaders’ Summit in September 2015, Prime Minister Cameron pledged to 
more than double UK military contributions to UN operations, with up to 70 personnel 
heading to the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) and between 250 and 300 to the UN 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).1 In November, the new Strategic Defence and Security 
Review reiterated the UK’s commitment to strengthen ‘the rules-based international order 
and its institutions’ and made three practical commitments to support UN peace operations.2 
First, the British military would prepare to ‘conduct operations to restore peace and 
stability’.3 Second, in addition to increasing its military peacekeepers, the UK would deploy 
more law enforcement and civilian experts, and continue training foreign peacekeepers.4 
Third, the government would create a ‘cross-Whitehall joint UN Peacekeeping Policy Unit to 
maximise our military and civilian impact’ and ‘formulate UK policy on peacekeeping 
missions.’5 The UK subsequently agreed to host the next Peacekeeping Leaders’ summit in 
September 2016 focused on the ‘three Ps’: planning of missions, performance of 
peacekeepers, and pledges made by existing and new troop-contributing countries (TCCs). 
It remains unclear whether these declarations represent a short-term, pragmatic 
response to domestic and international trends, a response to an initiative spearheaded by its 
most important strategic partner (the United States), or part of a longer-term rethink of how 
the UK pursues its foreign and security policies. It is uncertain, in part, because the UK’s 
                                                        
1 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘PM pledges UK troops to support stability in Somalia and South Sudan,’ 28 
September 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-pledges-uk-troops-to-support-stability-in-somalia-
and-south-sudan    
2 HM Government, A Secure, p.29 and HM Government, UK Aid, p.13. 
3 HM Government, A Secure, p. 29. 
4 Ibid, p. 60. 
5 Ibid, pp.60, 84. 
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approach to UN peacekeeping has never been entirely clear. Historically, UK policies on UN 
peacekeeping were driven by pragmatic responses to particular crises, regardless of which 
political party was in power. 
After providing an overview of UK engagement with UN peacekeeping since 1956 
we discuss the political issues that govern British decision-making in this area. The third 
section then assesses several challenges that need to be overcome in order for the UK’s 
increased participation in UN missions to be effective. Finally, we summarize the main 
factors pushing the UK towards greater engagement with UN peace operations, including 
opinions voiced by select domestic, international and institutional audiences. 
 
A UK ‘return’ to UN peacekeeping? 
Analyzing a UK ‘return’ to UN peacekeeping implies that the UK ‘left’, which is not the 
case. The UK has consistently engaged with UN peacekeeping through political, financial, 
and capacity-building activities as well as maintaining deployments of personnel. As a 
permanent member of the Security Council the UK has a major political role in influencing 
peacekeeping mandates, including as a ‘pen holder’.6 Financially, the UK long provided just 
under 7% of the UN’s annual peacekeeping bill, although in 2016 this dropped to 5.8% 
making the UK the sixth largest financial contributor behind the US, China, Japan, Germany 
and France.7 The UK also makes a notable contribution to the UN’s regular budget, which 
funds the UN’s special political missions, and makes additional voluntary contributions 
(either in cash or in kind) to support UN peacekeeping. It is also the leading donor to the 
UN’s peacebuilding fund.8 Moreover, the UK has remained active in various oversight 
                                                        
6 A ‘pen-holder’ is the Security Council member that leads in drafting resolutions. The UK is pen-holder on 
peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Darfur, as well as the thematic areas of 
peacekeeping operations and protection of civilians. 
7 See UN docs A/67/224/Add.1, 27 December 2012; A/C.5/69/17, 14 January 2015 and A/70/331, 19 August 
2015, Annex III. 
8 UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, The Peacebuilding Fund, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000 
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mechanisms, such as the UN’s Military Staff Committee, as well as supporting initiatives 
such as the new UN Strategic Force Generation Cell.9 
Nor did the UK’s armed forces ever completely disengage from UN peacekeeping. 
They have provided significant ‘back end’ support capacities for peacekeeping and carried 
out bilateral assistance and capacity-building initiatives to support other contributing 
countries to UN and non-UN peace operations. These include programmes in Kenya, South 
Africa, Sierra Leone, and the Czech Republic. Britain has also recently provided strategic 
airlift for UN missions in Mali and South Sudan, supported several European Union training 
missions, including in Somalia and Mali, which have supported UN operations in these 
theatres, and provided short-term engineering assistance to the non-UN Multinational Force 
and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.10 UK forces in Kosovo and Bosnia operating under EU 
and NATO flags have provided military personnel with experience in peace operations 
without donning blue helmets. The UK’s deployment of 1,300 personnel (including a logistic 
ship, helicopters, engineers and medical personnel) to Sierra Leone in 2015 to assist in the 
international effort to combat Ebola is just one example of the UK forces’ continued 
engagement in non-traditional military operations.11 
In this sense, we analyze a UK ‘return’ to UN peacekeeping by focusing on the 
prospects for the UK deploying more military personnel in UN missions. Our argument is not 
that the UK’s contribution should be judged solely on the number of personnel deployed. 
Adding another company of troops to the UN mission in Cyprus, for instance, would increase 
the UK’s position in the TCC rankings but have little strategic impact. Instead this article 
aims to contribute to the debate about how best UK military power can help enhance the 
effectiveness of UN peace operations at a time when, for the first time in well over a decade, 
                                                        
9 Interview, UK official, New York, June 2016. 
10 HM Government, ‘Defence Secretary announces UK support to peacekeeping mission,’ 25 February 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-uk-support-to-peacekeeping-mission 
11 IISS, The Military Balance 2016, p.72. 
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it has started deploying two contingents of troops to new UN missions (in Somalia and South 
Sudan). 
 
A Short History of the UK and UN Peacekeeping 
Historically, the UK’s relationship with UN peace operations has been driven principally by 
wider strategic national interests or concerns about stabilizing particular crises. When the UK 
directly engaged with UN operations, notably those in the Suez, the Congo, Cyprus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone, its approach fluctuated between hostility, confused 
engagement, and supporting the UN’s bureaucratic structures. 
 
Cold War Missions 
During the Cold War UN peacekeeping had relatively little influence on British foreign and 
defence policies and the relationship was often distinctly frosty to the UN missions in 
question.12 Ironically, it was the British invasion of the Suez Canal that precipitated the UN’s 
first armed peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I). Here, the UK’s 
intransigent policy towards the UN’s attempts to create UNEF saw its diplomats veto 
successive Security Council resolutions that called for Israeli withdrawal from the invaded 
territories and the establishment of a peacekeeping force.13 Instead, the UK and France 
argued they could do the job themselves. Consequently, UNEF I was created through the UN 
General Assembly under its ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.14 UK policymakers still attempted 
to shoehorn UNEF’s mandate into achieving the goals of the original invasion by proposing 
that the UN mission should be comprised of British and French soldiers. Instead, UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (under considerable pressure from the United States) 
                                                        
12 See Briscoe, Britain and Koops et al, The Oxford Handbook. 
13 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Encyclopedia, p.262. 
14 Briscoe, Britain, p.46. 
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prohibited UK and French forces joining UNEF, opting instead for peacekeepers from neutral 
countries.15 Even prominent members of the Commonwealth were excluded, including a 
contingent from New Zealand on the grounds that it was too ‘pro British’ (New Zealand had 
supported the British invasion). So was a Pakistani force. A Canadian battalion was put into 
reserve because it was feared that Egyptians would mistake them for British soldiers.16 
UK actions in the Suez represented a discredited colonial approach to an increasingly 
post-colonial world whereas the UN stood for a ‘modern, and morally superior’ method of 
dispute settlement.17 Legacies of colonialism also influenced UK policy towards other 
peacekeeping operations, with policymakers often favoring the colonial system over the UN. 
In the debates leading up to the deployment of ONUC in the Congo in 1960, UK diplomats 
supported the Belgian government’s attempt to dismantle the newly independent state by 
deploying soldiers and administrators to support the secession of the mineral-rich Katanga 
province.18 
It was in this context that a potential UN operation in Cyprus became a strategic 
concern for the UK. As the former colonial power, the UK had a degree of responsibility in 
managing the transition to post-colonial rule. But Cyprus was also important for maintaining 
a UK military presence in the wider Middle East.19 When the question of multilateral 
engagement in Cyprus was raised following increasing violence between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots at the end of 1963, British forces deployed to assist in upholding a ceasefire. The 
UK’s preferred option was for a NATO mission, principally to safeguard against potential 
Soviet influence. Instead, British troops became a leading part of the subsequent UN mission, 
                                                        
15 Ibid, p. 47. 
16 Harbottle, The Blue Berets, p.15. 
17 Briscoe, Britain, p.47. 
18 On the UK’s role in the Congo crisis see James, Britain. 
19 Parsons, From Cold War, p.167. See also Briscoe, Britain, pp.173ff. 
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UNFICYP, established in March 1964. The UK also retained the forces already stationed in 
its Sovereign Base Areas on the island, a commitment that endures today. 
While many other countries were finding allies at the UN to forge a more constructive 
approach to international conflict management, some of the UK’s foreign policy 
commitments pushed in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the Cyprus experience taught 
British foreign policy elites that UN peacekeeping also offered some constructive 
opportunities. For the rest of the Cold War, UK troops were hardly involved in UN 
peacekeeping activity. Perhaps the only other notable development was the 1988 publication 
of Army Field Manual Volume V, Part I, Peacekeeping Operations, produced to guide British 
troops through the intricacies of keeping the peace in situations of inter-state armed 
conflict.20 
 
Peacekeeping in the Balkans 
After the Cold War, British engagement with UN peacekeeping was marred by a lack of 
agreement over the roles that UN operations should play in relation to UK policy. In the 
1990s, it was how these debates played out in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that generated 
most of the tensions between UK policymakers and the UN. 
It was as part of UNPROFOR that the UK had its largest, and most costly, experience 
in UN peacekeeping. In mid-1995, this engagement briefly made the UK the top UN TCC.21 
UNPROFOR also had consecutive British Force Commanders (Generals Michael Rose and 
Rupert Smith). In contrast, UNPROFOR’s dilemmas concerning how to keep the peace in an 
active war zone where levels of consent ranged from suspicion of peacekeepers to outright 
hostility, left UK policymakers and many senior military personnel with an abiding image 
                                                        
20 Wikinson, Sharpening the Weapons, pp.1-2. 
21 Williams, ‘The United Kingdom’, p.93. 
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that UN peacekeeping was deeply problematic and generally to be avoided where there was 
no clear peace to keep.22 
But the UK government was not simply a passive recipient of UN peacekeeping 
policy. The UK’s permanent seat on the Security Council gave it an important role in crafting 
the UNPROFOR mandates and hence partial responsibility for the problems it lamented.23 
Specifically, the Security Council passed a total of sixty-seven resolutions in the space of 
forty months on the wars in former Yugoslavia.24 Often, these resolutions pushed 
UNPROFOR deeper into the quagmire of managing several actively warring parties. A 
particular source of controversy revolved around whether peacekeepers should use force to 
ensure humanitarian assistance made it to so-called ‘safe areas’ in spite of the fact that this 
ran directly counter to the war aims of several of the belligerents. This led some parties to 
‘wreak revenge on UNPROFOR’.25 
It also generated confusion among British troops within UNPROFOR as to how to 
deal with belligerent groups. At times, commanders would use sophisticated networks of 
liaison officers to negotiate the delivery of humanitarian aid.26 At other times, they would 
attempt to enforce the Chapter VII nature of the mandate by using robust force to simply 
drive through any obstacle put in the UN’s way.27 Others described a bleak situation: 
We did what we could but we were constantly hampered by the mandate and the lack 
of clear statement of exactly what we were there to do. We did not have the backing, 
or the teeth, to peacekeep and the locals knew this. Most of the time, we were 
powerless to stop the killing and the standing of the UN fell to an all time low…28 
                                                        
22 See, for instance, Smith, The Utility of Force, pp.336-337; Stewart, Broken Lives, p.325, Goodwin, The 
Military, p.170. 
23 For details, see Simms, Unfinest Hour. 
24 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p.180. 
25 Goulding, Peacemonger, p.327. 
26 Stewart, Broken Lives, p.319. 
27 Rose, Fighting for Peace, pp.52-53. 
28 Kent-Payne, Bosnia Warriors, pp.352–353. 
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It took until 1994 for the UK to warm to the use of robust force against Serb forces, when 
NATO air power was used more regularly, alongside the development of a ‘well-armed and 
mobile’ Rapid Reaction Force, comprised of British, French, and Dutch soldiers.29 It was in 
August 1995 under UK Force Commander Rupert Smith that the NATO-led Operation 
Deliberate Force was used to target Bosnian Serb forces. However, this came only after 
Serb-led troops massacred some 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in the UN mandated 
‘safe area’ of Srebrenica in July, and launched a mortar attack on a Sarajevo marketplace in 
August. 
Although Bosnia attracted most political and public attention in the UK, these 
tendencies and problems were more widespread. For example, as the civil war re-started and 
the genocide unfolded in Rwanda from April 1994, and with the UK providing no 
peacekeepers to the UNAMIR operation there, its representative on the Security Council, 
David Hannay, argued against reinforcing the UN mission or giving it a more robust 
mandate. Taking the opposite approach to UK policy in Bosnia, Hannay argued that 
’peacekeeping was not appropriate for civil war and where fighting factions were unwilling 
to cooperate’.30 Once again, the UK government blamed incoherent peacekeeping mandates 
without acknowledging its own role in shaping those mandates. Unsurprisingly, after UN 
peacekeepers faced similar challenges in Somalia, Angola and elsewhere in the early 1990s, 
the UK was part of the subsequent general international retreat from UN peacekeeping.31 
 
The Sierra Leone Experience 
The return to UN peacekeeping began in 1999 with new missions in DR Congo, East Timor 
and Sierra Leone. It was the latter case that would feature heavily in British debates about the 
                                                        
29 Leurdijk, The United Nations, p.71. 
30 Melvern and Williams, ‘Britannia Waived the Rules’, p.10. 
31 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, chapter 4. 
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new ‘ethical’ foreign policy touted by Tony Blair’s New Labour government. Specifically, in 
1998, Blair’s government became embroiled in a diplomatic controversy over its role in 
supporting the return of ousted Sierra Leonean President Ahmed Kabbah, including through 
the use of military supplies in breach of a UN arms embargo on the country.32 After being 
forced to take over from a Nigerian-led ECOWAS enforcement operation after Nigeria 
withdrew, the UN mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, was attacked by the rebel 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).33 UNAMSIL suffered similar challenges to its 
predecessors ranging from how to uphold a weak peace agreement (that the UK helped 
formulate34) and how to use force when faced with increasingly confident rebels committing 
atrocities against civilians. In May 2000, rebels kidnapped some 500 UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers, sparking a major crisis in New York.35 It was with this breakdown in the UN 
mission and the resulting instability as well as the desire to support President Kabbah’s 
government that were the primary drivers of UK military intervention.36 
Codenamed Operation Palliser, British troops worked in parallel with but outside of 
UNAMSIL to achieve their first objective: the evacuation of UK citizens and other entitled 
personnel.37 British troops also helped UNAMSIL create a secure zone in and around 
Freetown, which provided a stable base for expansion. The UK’s role gradually evolved from 
an evacuation force, to a stabilization force, to a combat search and rescue force, and then, 
finally, to a training body for Sierra Leone’s national armed forces after the war.38 British 
troops are credited with tipping the psychological balance of the war against the rebels, 
especially after the major battle that occurred during the rescue of British hostages in 
                                                        
32 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Second Report on Sierra Leone. 
33 Olonisakin, Peacekeeping. 
34 Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown’, pp.147-53. 
35 CDS, A Review of Peace Operations, p.75. 
36 Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown’, pp.153-4. 
37 CDS, A Review of Peace Operations, p.73. 
38 Ibid, p.77. 
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September 2000.39 The UK’s aggressive stance persuaded many RUF fighters that 
cooperating with the UN was a better option than fighting British troops.40 
Although the UK’s presence certainly helped stabilize Sierra Leone, the main public 
justification for the operation was not to improve UN capacities to undertake robust 
peacekeeping. Overall, therefore, the UN’s lessons learned report on UNAMSIL commended 
the deterrence value of the UK’s ‘over-the-horizon’ force but noted that it would have been 
preferable ‘if UNAMSIL itself had been provided with the necessary capabilities and 
assets’.41 
 
The Domestic Politics of the UK’s Peacekeeping Decisions 
As with other areas of its foreign policies, it is difficult to pinpoint a formal process that 
consistently produces British decisions on peace operations. The decision to deploy UK 
military forces rests with the Government of the day. There is no legal requirement for 
Parliament (through debate and/or vote in the House of Commons or Lords42) to be involved 
in approving the deployment of armed forces, since the Royal Prerogative grants the Prime 
Minister authority to direct the armed forces without recourse to Parliamentary scrutiny.43 
It was the winding down of the Cold War and increased UK engagement that brought 
wider reflection about the role of UN peacekeeping within UK foreign and security policies. 
The debates revolved around UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 definition 
of peacekeeping as the ‘deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent of all the parties concerned’.44 For those skeptical of UN engagement, it was the 
                                                        
39 Dorman, Blair’s Successful War, chapters 6-7. 
40 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, pp.272-273. 
41 UN, Lessons Learned, pp.40- 41. 
42 The Lower House of Parliament, consisting of 650 elected Members of Parliament; the ‘upper house’ is the 
unelected House of Lords. 
43 Strong, ‘Interpreting the Syria vote’, p.1123. 
44 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda, p.11. 
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use of the word ‘hitherto’ that was most important because consent was now likely to be a 
variable and problematic factor in peacekeeping deployments. The 1993 Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee’s report on the UN and UK foreign policy summed up this concern in the 
following manner: 
There are good reasons why UN troops, even when mandated to use force if they are 
obstructed by factions on the ground, do so only rarely. The United Nations needs to 
maintain its impartiality even though the effects of its activities might be regarded by 
one of the parties as partial; it needs the continued cooperation of the parties if it is to 
be successful no matter how frustrating the barriers put in its way to prevent peace-
keeping troops quickly executing their mission; the troops are not equipped to fight 
their way through – they have been armed on the expectation that the parties will 
honour their commitments – therefore their wisest choice is to negotiate their way 
through.45 
The report raised a series of questions about the UN’s capacities, and concluded that 
the Security Council must be persuaded that not all proposals for peacekeeping operations 
can be put into effect successfully. Consequently, the UK should ‘use its influence in the 
Security Council to ensure that peacekeeping operations... are entered into only when there is 
a realistic prospect of their objectives being achieved’.46 
While the Foreign Affairs Select Committee cautioned against UN peacekeeping in 
active civil wars, the UK’s Defence Select Committee issued a June 1993 report that 
concluded as a permanent member of the Security Council the UK had a special duty and 
responsibility to provide peacekeepers – a theme reiterated in the recent High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations.47 It also showed that the UK could use peacekeeping 
                                                        
45 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Expanding Role, p.xxi. 
46 Ibid, p.xxvi. 
47 HIPPO, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, para.199. 
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operations to maintain its international reputation and influence on the international stage. ‘If 
the increase in United Nations peacekeeping operations is not matched by at least something 
approaching a commensurate increase in UK participation’, the report argued, ‘the United 
Kingdom’s voice in international affairs will lose authority, and the operations themselves 
will be less likely to succeed.’48 The Committee also concluded that UK forces should 
participate only in missions that require their particular skills and where there was a serious 
chance of a successful outcome.49 Notably, the report was published after British 
peacekeepers had deployed in UNPROFOR but stated that these criteria had been met. 
When UK troops deployed to Sierra Leone in 2000, parliamentary approval was not 
sought and UK policymakers were unwilling to publicly justify Operation Palliser as a 
mechanism to support the failing UNAMSIL operation, instead emphasizing the need to 
rescue UK citizens in peril rather than make the case for strengthening the UN mission. The 
first that the UK public heard of the decision to send a ‘spearhead force’ to Sierra Leone 
came one day before the British High Commissioner for Sierra Leone instigated the 
evacuation of UK nationals, and the start of the operation.50 
Since Operation Palliser, successive governments offered proposals to give 
Parliament greater say in the deployment of ‘significant, non-routine’ UK military 
operations.51 During the Conservative-Liberal coalition government (2010-2015), it was 
acknowledged that although Parliament had no legal reason to discuss military operations, a 
‘convention’ had emerged whereby the House of Commons would have the opportunity to 
debate the deployment of UK forces, as occurred concerning Libya (2011), Syria (2013), and 
Iraq (2014).52 
                                                        
48 House of Commons Defence Select Committee, United Kingdom Peacekeeping, p.xxii. 
49 Ibid p. xxiii. 
50 Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown’, p.161. 
51 Mills, Parliamentary approval, p.17. 
52 Ibid, p.6. 
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Deployments in UN peacekeeping operations, however, did not generate the same 
level of Parliamentary interest as these forcible military interventions. As the House of 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee concluded in 2014: ‘We do not… 
want the Government to be required to consult with or seek approval from the House on 
peacekeeping or training missions.’53 The Committee argued that there must be definitional 
boundaries for what is discussed in the House of Commons, specifically whether Parliament 
should debate any deployment of UK forces, or just deployments where UK forces would 
play a combat role. The current convention was said to be ‘dependent on a shared 
understanding between Parliament and the Government’ that Parliament only discusses 
situations where UK armed forces are deployed with the intention of engaging in combat.54 
UN peacekeeping operations were deemed to fall outside this category. 
This conclusion highlights two difficulties.55 First, ‘peacekeeping’ deployments 
escape scrutiny by elected officials. For instance, the Coalition Government’s 2013 decision 
to deploy forces in Mali – including a surveillance aircraft, up to 40 military personnel to the 
EU training mission, and the ‘potential deployment of up to 200 military personnel for the 
training of Anglophone forces in the UN-mandated African-led International Support 
Mission in Mali (AFISMA)’56 – was not debated in Parliament on the basis that UK forces 
would not be engaged in combat. Although ministers argued that the convention would be 
followed ‘were troops to be committed to conflict’, it led to criticism that ministers, the civil 
service and political parties interpreted the convention too narrowly.57 Second, the minimal 
oversight mechanisms for peacekeeping deployments indicate how poorly prepared UK 
                                                        
53 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament's role, p.17. 
54 Ibid, p.17. The UK Parliament does not scrutinize all foreign deployments of British special forces, including 
those engaged in combat. 
55 Written evidence from Professor Nigel White, at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/political-and-
constitutional-reform-committee/parliaments-role-in-conflict-decisions-an-update/written/2838.pdf  
56 Mills, Parliamentary approval, p.25. 
57 Weir, “Not in our name.” 
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parliamentary structures are for scrutinizing policymakers in the event that UK forces 
deployed into non-permissive peacekeeping environments suffered casualties. The 
committee’s view seems to imply that UN peacekeeping will always be viewed as a more 
benign activity than other UK military deployments. This is a highly debatable point in 
volatile theatres such as Somalia and South Sudan where the UK has now deployed 
uniformed personnel. 
 
Explaining the UK’s Peacekeeping Contributions 
Since the conclusion of UNPROFOR, UN peacekeeping has clearly not been a central 
consideration in the UK’s policymaking processes. By 1999, Blair’s Government seemed to 
conclude that it was NATO not the UN that could deliver favourable results for the UK. 
Speaking at NATO’s 50th Anniversary, Blair said that in Bosnia, British forces deployed 
under the UN ‘could only deal with the symptoms of the problem’. ‘It was NATO’, on the 
other hand ‘that brought serious force to bear and gave the desperately needed muscle to end 
the war’, as well as underpinning the post-Dayton peace and creating the ‘conditions in which 
Bosnia can rebuild’.58 Indeed, until 2010, the UK remained militarily engaged in the Balkans 
through NATO, assisting with the standby force reserve, and in 2008 reinforcing the mission 
with a battalion of about 600 soldiers to help maintain ‘public order’.59 
The experience in Sierra Leone saw UK forces remain outside the UN operation, 
primarily because the Ministry of Defence (MOD) was skeptical of UN competence and its 
command and control mechanisms.60 The MOD had argued that in order to effect a major 
change in UNAMSIL’s fortunes the UK would have to become a major contributor to the 
                                                        
58 Tony Blair, speech, 8 March 1999, http://www.ukpol.co.uk/2015/12/17/tony-blair-1999-speech-at-natos-50th-
anniversary/  
59 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘New Mission for British Troops in Kosovo,’ The Guardian, 25 April 2008. 
60 Dorman, Blair’s Successful War, p.88.  
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mission and perhaps take on the force commander role, which was a non-starter politically.61 
As a result, British troops worked in parallel with but not as part of UNAMSIL in Sierra 
Leone; their first objective being the evacuation of UK citizens, not supporting the 
floundering UN operation.62 
After Sierra Leone, the US-led ‘global war on terror’ and the subsequent invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq pushed any discussion of contributing to additional UN peacekeeping 
operations firmly off the political agenda. The UK’s political and military involvement in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq were a combination of war-fighting, counter-insurgency and more 
recently stabilization operations rather than robust peacekeeping of the UN variety. 
Stabilization operations resembled some modern UN peacekeeping operations, being defined 
broadly as involving a combination of civilian and military approaches with a focus on re-
establishing state authority in ‘failed states’, including provision of ‘legitimate’ state 
authority, institution-building, and delivery of key state services. In this view, stabilization is 
supported by the use of military force, bordering on counter-insurgency, and predominantly 
aimed against non-state actors who challenge the state’s monopoly on violence.63 The UK’s 
costly campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq led to cuts elsewhere, including to existing UK 
commitments to UN peacekeeping, with UK army reserves taking the place of regular forces 
in UNFICYP in 2008.64 
Taken together, these decision-making structures and historical experiences coalesced 
to keep British engagement with UN peacekeeping mainly of a political and financial nature, 
bolstered by various capacity-building initiatives to support other contributing countries 
deploy on UN missions. Cyprus remained the exception. This has been described as 
                                                        
61 Ibid, p.88 and Williams, ‘The United Kingdom’, p.110. 
62 CDS, A Review of Peace Operations, p.73. 
63 See Jackson and Haysom, The search, p.9; Gordon, ‘The United Kingdom’s,’ p.S383; and Curran and 
Holtom, ‘Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting’. 
64 Williams, ‘The United Kingdom’, p.108. 
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‘economy of effort’ whereby the UK can influence UN peacekeeping without having to 
expend significant resources.65 
Within this overall context, three main factors are likely to shape the level of UK 
personnel deployments in UN peace operations: whether UN peace operations deploy to 
areas of UK strategic interest; concerns that operational challenges are increasing the risks to 
UN peacekeepers; and how far the UK is prepared to deploy more troops to UN peace 
operations. 
 
Misaligned strategic priorities 
Since 1999, the majority of new UN peacekeeping operations – eight out of the ten largest – 
and a large majority of UN peacekeepers were deployed in sub-Saharan Africa. This region is 
not a primary strategic concern for the UK. Especially after the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq it was difficult for any British government to justify additional ‘out of area operations’. 
Any future operations would need to be ‘operationally feasible and have broad international 
support’, and show clear net benefits for the UK.66 The UK thus shared the position of most 
other Western states not to provide many UN peacekeepers.67 Some critics challenged as 
shortsighted the West’s ‘outsourcing’ of conflict management on the African continent, 
where African personnel were trained and equipped to ‘bear the burden’ of complex 
operations.68 Although the UK made a token contribution to the EU’s Operation Artemis in 
the DR Congo for a few months in 2003 and was an important player in developing the 
concept of expeditionary EU battlegroups, to date, these battlegroups have not deployed and 
the UK shunned other EU-led military operations in the DR Congo, including the 2006 EU 
force. In late 2008, the UK refused to deploy its troops as an EU battlegroup to help the UN’s 
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MONUC mission defend the town of Goma in eastern DR Congo despite being the lead state 
of one of the EU battlegroups that was supposed to be on call at that time.69 As Balossi-
Restelli suggested, such a deployment faced significant opposition within the British military, 
which argued an EU deployment would place ‘serious strain’ on its already stretched forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.70 
Over the same period, the UK also reduced significantly its contributions to UN 
policing.71 The reduction of UK civilian peacekeepers drew criticism that the UK pursued a 
‘neglectful’ approach to international policing as a whole, and the work of the UN DPKO’s 
police division in particular.72 
The challenge of strategic misalignment still affects the recent British attempts to 
provide UN peacekeepers. When pledging to commit British peacekeepers to Somalia and 
South Sudan in September 2015, Prime Minister Cameron couched the pledge in terms of 
advancing UK national interests not peacekeeping. ‘What happens in Somalia,’ Cameron 
said, ‘if it’s a good outcome, it’s good for Britain, it means less terrorism, less migration, less 
piracy; ditto South Sudan.’73 Regardless of the dubious links between South Sudan’s conflict 
and piracy, migration and terrorism threats in the UK, the UK Government’s press release 
was notable for not stating the pledge was part of an effort to create a sustainable future for 
UN peace operations.74 
 
The risk factor 
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Senior figures in UK politics remain concerned about the limited operational capabilities 
available to most UN missions. For example, at a 2015 workshop organized to discuss a 
possible European ‘return’ to UN peace operations, MOD officials pointed to significant UN 
gaps in the types of support capacities that the UK requires in order to deploy its forces. 
These included shortfalls in contingency planning, health and safety, and logistical support. 
From this perspective an increase in UK military contributions would also require additional 
support units. The alternative view was that while deployment on UN missions should come 
with different expectations to unilateral or NATO deployments, the deployment of more 
troops and specialist capabilities by Western states, including the UK, would raise standards 
in UN operations.75 
Such concerns are particularly pertinent given the current risks to personnel in many 
UN’s peace operations. In 2015, Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
Hervé Ladsous stated that the number of ‘hostile acts targeting peacekeepers, including by 
small arms fire, IEDs ... and ambushes, has more than doubled each year over the last three 
years.’76 The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has become one of the most deadly UN 
peace operations ever. 
This debate is significant for the UK because of strong domestic pressures on 
policymakers. Studies of public opinion in the wake of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
show that deploying ground troops in an overseas combat role is ‘inhibited by public, 
political and media skepticism [sic] about the utility of force’.77 For example, Clement’s 
assessment of public opinion and military intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya found 
that an increasing number of UK casualties in Afghanistan led to a ‘growing wariness in 
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domestic opinion’ towards the campaign as a whole.78 In turn, this has had a negative impact 
on public opinion to wider questions of whether the UK should intervene in conflicts in the 
Middle East.79 In addition, Gribble et al concluded that after Iraq and Afghanistan the British 
public would show an increasingly strong preference for ‘military force to be used only to 
address clear and present threats to the UK or increased support for a less active role for the 
UK in international affairs’.80 Future interventions, will hence require a ‘stronger case for 
involvement’ to gain approval from the public, as missions ‘whose reasons seem irrelevant or 
ambiguous, particularly if there is a perception that they may result in another prolonged 
campaign’ would receive little support.81 With over half of all UN peacekeepers deployed in 
theaters where the UN has had a presence for over ten years the task of justifying greater 
engagement to a skeptical public will be difficult. Such concerns may explain why in July 
2016 the UK secretly withdrew its two police officers deployed in UNMISS in South Sudan, 
prompting the UN to disbar the UK from becoming a police-contributing country to that 
mission.82 
 
Is the UK well prepared? 
Larger British military contributions to UN peace operations should only be conducted if the 
UK is well prepared, militarily and politically. One issue is how to ensure sufficient force 
protection for peacekeepers but there are other concerns, such as the lack of an effective 
bureaucratic structure. Another relates to career progression in the British military where 
peacekeeping deployments are not considered a major opportunity to gain promotion. It 
remains to be seen what form the proposed cross-Whitehall peacekeeping policy unit will 
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assume and how far it can address some of these issues. In financial terms, austerity is hardly 
conducive to selling plans to increase military contributions to UN missions that would 
undoubtedly cost British taxpayers despite the UN’s financial reimbursement mechanisms.83 
Militarily, with the exception of Cyprus – arguably one of the least demanding of all 
UN peacekeeping operations – the British armed forces have had a long hiatus of direct 
experience in more robust UN missions. A significant number of senior British officers are 
familiar with some of the UN’s peacekeeping missions of the early 1990s but very few have 
experience of the organization’s big missions of the 2000s and 2010s. Importantly, the MOD 
has recognized the necessity of increased ‘immersion’ into contemporary peacekeeping 
practices should UK personnel be asked to deploy on UN operations. Moreover, troops 
identified for deployment must have the ‘requisite training, capability, and understanding of 
peacekeeping operations to be effective’.84 While there is some overlap, this will not be 
identical to that required for the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Attempts to re-orientate some of the UK’s armed forces to the demands of UN peace 
operations will not be a quick-fix, particularly if resistance emerges from those who believe 
that peacekeeping is not an appropriate use of the British army’s war-fighting capabilities. 
This is a longstanding debate. In 2001, for example, Chief of the UK Defence Staff, General 
Sir Charles Guthrie argued against becoming ‘too focussed on the ‘softer’ end of the conflict 
spectrum’, because more peacekeeping deployments would result in ‘misuse of personnel and 
equipment, and an inability to execute operations towards the high-intensity warfighting end 
of the spectrum’.85 Without a large deployment of British troops in a non-permissive UN 
peacekeeping theatre, it is hard to test Guthrie’s assertion. It is notable, however, that some 
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European powers have recently deployed significant numbers of troops to the UN’s most 
deadly mission in Mali.86 
 
Opportunities for Increasing British Peacekeeping Contributions 
The challenges outlined above are real but not insurmountable. In examining the 
opportunities for increased involvement, changing domestic perceptions of UN peace 
operations, along with international persuasion may create momentum in UK policymaking. 
Additionally, although they have been out of UN operations for some time, the training and 
learning capacities of the UK military suggest the armed forces could cope with the tasks and 
help make UN missions more effective. 
 
Changes at home 
First, although there is skepticism about international military engagement, the British public 
retains a relatively favourable opinion of the UN and peacekeeping. A Pew poll found that 6 
in 10 saw the UN in a ‘favourable light’.87 A 2015 YouGov/Chatham House survey found 
68% of respondents agreed that the UK has a ‘responsibility to maintain international 
security’ while 58% agreed that the UK should provide more troops for international 
peacekeeping.88 More think tanks are also exploring potential options and the utility of 
greater UK engagement in UN peace operations.89 
Until recently, few establishment figures were making the same case but this has 
started to change. In December 2013, General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence 
Staff, argued that the UK must ‘be far more pro-active in our investment in UN 
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Operations’.90 In September 2014, then UK Permanent Representative at the UN, Mark Lyall 
Grant, stated that as UK forces ‘draw down in Afghanistan, we are looking actively at how 
we can increase our existing contribution [to UN missions], particularly in … niche-enabling 
areas.’91 In its 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the Government committed to 
‘Joint Force 2025,’ which set the baseline number of regular British Army personnel at 
82,000, and included the reconfiguration of a ‘number of infantry battalions… to provide an 
increased contribution to countering terrorism and building stability overseas’.92 Debate 
continues over how these battalions will be used, including whether they should focus on 
countering Mumbai-style attacks on the UK homeland or counter-insurgency abroad. As part 
of the UK’s restructuring, the House of Commons Defence Committee called for more 
flexible deployment capabilities.93 Examining the development of UN peace operations in 
theatres such as Mali, the Committee argued that the MOD should re-examine ‘the successes 
of Sierra Leone and Bosnia, and ask what capabilities might be required to improve the 
chance of success in current crisis zones such as Libya, Yemen, Ukraine or Iraq’.94 It is 
notable that the Committee linked these developments to earlier UN missions and conflict 
zones that might end up hosting a UN operation. 
The mainstream UK political parties have also warmed to UN peacekeeping. 
Alongside the series of commitments made by the Conservative-led government, the Labour 
Party has offered similar policies towards UN peacekeeping.95 This could herald a period of 
relative cross-parliamentary consensus that the UK should deploy more troops and other 
personnel to UN missions. 
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Changes abroad 
Current international debates about UN peacekeeping occur in a context of a concerted US-
led initiative over the last three years to increase European contributions to UN peace 
operations.96 At the first High-Level summit on ‘Strengthening United Nations Peace 
Operations’ in September 2014 the UK’s intervention was the last speech and offered very 
little in the way of concrete steps and commitments.97 Since then, however, at the 2015 
leaders’ summit the UK pledged to roughly double its troops in UN operations from about 
300 to about 600, as well as host the follow-on summit (noted above). This has forced the UK 
to play a significant behind-the-scenes role in drumming up and sustaining support for UN 
operations. This would have been easier to do if the UK had fully delivered on its 2015 
pledges. 
 
Military debates 
Among the British armed forces, UN peace operations still occupy at best an ambiguous 
niche. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the armed forces have completely 
ignored UN operations. Historically, there have been some interesting and detailed reflections 
by UK officers.98 Even after the UNPROFOR operation, which generated very negative 
attitudes throughout large sections of the British army, high profile UK military personnel 
engaged in debates over the future role of UN peacekeeping.99 Moreover, British engagement 
in the Bosnian war was the principal reason for the publication of Wider Peacekeeping, the 
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UK’s first peacekeeping doctrine specifically designed for personnel deploying into intra-
state armed conflict.100 
The UK military has also maintained an important role in training for peacekeeping. 
The UK’s military officer training programme, for instance, incorporates a range of topics, 
including on negotiation skills and techniques for military personnel.101 This is supported by 
research and development into doctrine undertaken by the Doctrine and Concepts Centre, and 
supported by other groups that have developed specialized capabilities to work with civilian 
organisations in the context of stabilisation operations.102 The UK has also begun to prepare 
its armed forces for peacekeeping, including potentially looking towards models of co-
deployment with other European states.103 In January 2015, for example, the UK and Ireland 
agreed to enhance cooperation to support the UK Armed Forces engagement in peacekeeping 
operations.104 It is also entirely plausible that the UK’s new deployments to Somalia and 
South Sudan will generate significant, positive lessons learned. 
Depending on how similar debates unfold in other NATO states, one outstanding 
question is the extent to which future UN peace operations will resemble the counter-
insurgency and stabilisation operations that characterised the UK’s campaigns in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. If this does turn out to be the trend, then while the risks to personnel will be 
considerable the need for the UK to re-learn UN peacekeeping as involving a separate set of 
skills might be diminished. As outlined above, the UK has had about fifteen years of 
significant experience of stabilisation and this has undoubtedly influenced the military’s 
doctrine, training, and operational planning. Interestingly, in mid-2015 the NATO Allied 
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Joint Doctrine superseded the UK Doctrine and Concept Centre’s only doctrine note on 
peacekeeping.105 This may indicate that the UK will follow a NATO model of ‘Peace Support 
Operations’ in the foreseeable future. 
 
Conclusion 
With the winding down of British military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, a UN 
peacekeeping system under record pressure, and the spectre of more and more challenging 
UN peace operations on the horizon, a debate has emerged over what future roles the UK 
should play to support effective UN peace operations. With a few exceptions, during the 
twenty-first century British troops have not been called on to deploy as UN peacekeepers. 
Instead, the UK’s main contributions to UN peacekeeping came through its strategic 
influence at the UN Security Council, its financial contributions to the budget, and its efforts 
to train other countries’ peacekeepers. This changed somewhat with Prime Minister 
Cameron’s September 2015 pledge to send British troops into UN missions in South Sudan 
and Somalia. 
For greater British participation in UN peace operations to be useful for both the UN 
and for the UK, British policymakers need to clearly articulate where and how UN peace 
operations fit within their broader foreign, security and defence policies. The post-Cold War 
historical track record is not particularly positive. However, as a permanent member of the 
Security Council, a new stream of work on this issue being produced by British institutions 
and think tanks, and its commitment to host the 2016 high-level summit on peacekeeping, 
this is an opportune time for the British government to clarify how and where UN peace 
operations fit into its wider foreign policy goals and commitments. 
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The anticipated creation of a cross-Whitehall joint UN Peacekeeping Policy Unit 
might help answer these questions. And with armed conflicts spreading across North Africa 
and the Middle East, the European neighbourhood could well be the next theatre for multiple 
UN peace operations. Indeed, discussions have already started about how the UN might be a 
part of post-conflict international engagement in the wars in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and even 
potentially Ukraine. If some or all of these conflicts generate UN operations, the UK would 
need to use its political influence to ensure the most effective missions possible. It might also 
decide that it should provide some peacekeepers. The time is therefore right for the UK 
policy community to assess the utility of UN peace operations and how the UK can help 
make them a sustainable and robust mechanism to undertake international conflict 
management and resolution. 
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